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QUALIFIED RESIDENCE INTEREST
DEDUCTION: A WIN FOR UNMARRIED
CO-OWNERS 
Christine Manolakas* 
Despite the seemingly simple language of the statute, the interpretation of 
the home mortgage interest deduction has recently garnered much attention as 
the Internal Revenue Service and the courts grappled with its application to un-
married co-owners of a residence. In determining whether the indebtedness limi-
tations apply on a “per-residence” or “per-taxpayer” basis, the Internal Reve-
nue Service, the Tax Court, and the Ninth Circuit have conducted in-depth 
analysis of the language of the statute, the statute’s legislative history, implica-
tions of related tax provisions, social and policy concerns, and financial conse-
quences, and have consulted almost every canon of statutory interpretation. This 
Article examines the legislative history and evolution of the present qualified res-
idence interest deduction and analyzes the differing interpretations of the indebt-
edness limitations and the ultimate effect of the differing interpretations on tax-
payers with different marital status. Also examined is the Internal Revenue 
Service’s surprising announcement that it will follow the Ninth Circuit’s holding 
in Voss v. Commissioner that the indebtedness limitations apply separately to 
each unmarried co-owner of a residence. This Article concludes with a discussion 
of possible options for future legislation with regard to the qualified residence in-
terest deduction, repealing or limiting the current deduction or replacing the de-
duction with a tax credit.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 The marital status of an individual has long been an important considera-
tion in tax planning.1 Depending on the relative income of individuals, the tax 
laws may result in a marriage penalty or a marriage bonus. Although in recent 
years there has been interest in reducing marriage penalty, a decision by the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (“Ninth Circuit”) has resulted in a substantial 
marriage penalty in the application of one of the most popular deductions avail-
able to individuals. In Voss v. Commissioner, the issue was whether the home 
mortgage interest deduction applies on a per-residence or a per-taxpayer basis.2 
The Ninth Circuit held the indebtedness limitations apply separately to each co-
owner of a residence, thereby doubling the indebtedness limitations for unmar-
ried co-owners.3 
This Article discusses recent developments in the availability of the quali-
fied residence interest deduction, with a focus on the interpretation of the in-
debtedness limitations. The purpose of the Article is two-fold. First, it intends 
to be a tool for students, practitioners, and lawmakers desiring to learn more 
about the complexities of this important tax preference attached to homeowner-
ship. Second, it explores the many rules of statutory interpretation and con-
struction used by the Internal Revenue Service (“Service”) and the courts in ar-
1  See Rev. Rul. 76-255, 1976-2 C.B. 40 (disregarding “sham” divorces obtained to manipu-
late, for federal income tax purposes, an individual’s marital status as of the close of a tax 
year). 
2  Voss v. Comm’r, 796 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2015). 
3  Id. at 1068. 
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riving at very different results in the application of a seemingly straightforward 
statute.4 
 Part I explains the evolution of the deduction for interest paid on indebt-
edness and the historical events that caused taxpayers increased dependency on 
the ability to deduct interest on personal indebtedness. The Tax Reform Act of 
1986 and the Reform Act of 1987 are given special attention: the former estab-
lishing the first disallowance of a deduction for personal interest with an excep-
tion for home mortgage interest, and the latter greatly transforming the home 
mortgage interest deduction exception. The congressional intent of both of the-
se tax acts has been critical to the current interpretation of the statute. Part II 
considers additional issues that must be addressed prior to claiming a home 
mortgage interest deduction, such as the characterization of a payment as inter-
est, taxable year of the interest deduction, election to itemize deductions, and 
application to the alternative minimum tax. 
 Parts III and IV examine recent developments in the interpretation of the 
indebtedness limitations on the deductibility of qualified residence interest. Part 
III compares and analyzes the Tax Court’s statutory interpretation of the defini-
tion of acquisition indebtedness and home equity indebtedness in Pau v. Com-
missioner against the Service’s contrary interpretation of those terms in Reve-
nue Ruling 2010-25. Part IV details the very different application of the 
indebtedness limitations to unmarried co-owners of a qualified residence on a 
per-residence basis by the Tax Court, in Sophy v. Commissioner, and on a per-
taxpayer basis by the Ninth Circuit, in Voss v. Commissioner. Part V relates the 
surprising acquiescence by the Internal Revenue Service to the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Voss, applying the indebtedness limitations on a per-taxpayer basis.  
 Finally, in Part VI, the focus shifts to the question of whether the statute 
providing a deduction for qualified residence interest should continue in its cur-
rent form or be phased out over a period of years. The social policy and eco-
nomic effects of this tax preference are explored, and the cost in foregone reve-
nue of this tax expenditure is examined. Proposals to repeal or limit the current 
deduction or convert the current deduction into a more equitable tax credit are 
also considered. 
4  The distinction between “statutory interpretation” and “statutory construction” has been 
stated as follows: 
       Although the words “interpretation” and “construction” now appear to be used interchange-
ably, they are epistemologically different and maintaining the distinction is useful. Interpretation 
discerns meaning from the words of the statute, possibly as influenced by a variety of extrinsic 
sources; construction fills a gap and sometimes reads the statute contrary to its words, and is 
similarly influenced. 
JASPER L. CUMMINGS, JR., PRINCIPLES OF APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL TAX LAWS 18 (2010). 
202 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:199 
I. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE QUALIFIED RESIDENCE INTEREST
DEDUCTION 
 The deduction for interest on indebtedness is traceable to one of the origi-
nal Civil War income tax statutes.5 A deduction for all forms of interest on in-
debtedness was also part of the failed Income Tax Act of 18946 and, after the 
passage of the Sixteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, was 
part of the Revenue Act of 1913.7 “When laying the framework for the modern 
income tax code in 1913, Congress recognized the importance of allowing for 
the deduction of expenses incurred in the generation of income, which [was] 
consistent with traditional economic theories of taxable income.”8 As a result, 
the Revenue Act of 1913 allowed a deduction for all interest paid within the tax 
year on all types of indebtedness.9  
 The legislative history of the interest deduction is “obscure.”10 Congress 
gave no explanation for not distinguishing between interest incurred in the per-
sonal affairs of the taxpayer and interest incurred in the business and invest-
ment activities of the taxpayer.11 Perhaps, the interest deduction was intended 
to equalize the tax treatment of taxpayers who must borrow in order to engage 
in personal, business, or for-profit activities and taxpayers who engage in such 
activities with their own capital.12 The breadth of the provision, allowing a de-
duction for all interest paid, may be based on the administrative difficulty in 
segregating personal indebtedness from business or investment indebtedness.13 
5  Michael Asimow, The Interest Deduction, 24 UCLA L. REV. 749, 749 (1977); see Act of 
Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 78, 13 Stat. 469, 469, 480 (amending Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, 13 
Stat. 223 (1864)). 
6  Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 28, 28 Stat. 509, 553 (1895) (addressing deductions). The 
Supreme Court held the Tax Act of 1894 unconstitutional as the tax on the income from real 
property was held a direct tax thus violating Article 1, Section 2, clause 3 and Section 9, 
clause 4 of the Constitution, requiring direct taxes to be apportioned among the several states 
according to population. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 586 (1895), 
vacated by, 158 U.S. 601 (1895), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend. XVI. 
7  Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167 (1915) (addressing deductions al-
lowed). 
8  MARK P. KEIGHTLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43385, AN ANALYSIS OF THE GEOGRAPHIC 
DISTRIBUTION OF MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION 1 (2014) (citing 50 CONG. REC. 3832 
(1913) (statement of Sen. Borah)). 
9  Id. at 1–2. 
10  See Asimow, supra note 5. 
11  Id. at 749 nn.2–3; see I.R.C. § 262(a) (2012) (disallowing, generally, a deduction “for per-
sonal, living, or family expenses”); see also id. § 162(a) (allowing, generally, a deduction for 
“all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred” in the course of doing business); 
id. § 163(a) (allowing, generally, a deduction for “all interest paid or accrued”). 
12  Asimow, supra note 5. 
13  Id. at 750. The provision’s breadth may also be the result of high exemption amounts with 
the consequence of only a small fraction of individuals being liable for federal income tax in 
the 1913 tax year. J. MARTIN BURKE & MICHAEL K. FRIEL, TAXATION OF INDIVIDUAL:
INCOME 4 (11th ed. 2015). 
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Arguably, the ability to deduct personal interest endured because of its positive 
effect on the economy by stimulating credit purchases.14 The ability to deduct 
interest on personal debt encouraged credit purchases of consumer goods and 
provided a strong incentive to purchase, rather than rent, a home.15 
 “The history of federal taxation in the United States mirrors the history of 
the nation.”16 With the increase in automobile use during the 1920s, the number 
of home mortgages exceeded the number of farm mortgages.17 In the 1930s, the 
mortgage industry was strengthened by the creation of the Federal Housing 
Administration (“FHA”), which regulated interest rates and the terms of mort-
gages, and the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”), which 
provided local banks with federal money to finance home loans.18 Home own-
ership grew rapidly with the return of soldiers after World War II and, by the 
1950s, the majority of homeowners had mortgages.19 As a result of the high tax 
rates during and after World War II, the impact of the home interest deduction 
on home purchases became significant.20 By the 1960s, 62 percent of Ameri-
cans owned their own home.21 During the 1970s, individuals began to incur 
credit card debt, which also generated a deduction for interest paid on any un-
paid balance.22 
A. Tax Reform Act of 1986
 The Tax Reform Act of 198623 has been called “the most far-reaching and
fundamental revision of the federal income tax system in its history.”24 The 
most notable features of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 are the significant broad-
ening of the tax base and the dramatic lowering of the rate structure, for both 
individual and corporate taxpayers.25 “The new law has dramatically altered the 
tax stakes and the planning strategies for virtually every type of taxpayer and 
14  Asimow, supra note 5, at 750. 
15  Id.; see also I.R.C. § 164(a)(1) (deduction for real property taxes, providing strong incen-
tives for home ownership); id. § 121(a) (exclusion of gain on the sale of a principal resi-
dence, also providing strong incentives for home ownership). 
16  PAUL R. MCDANIEL ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 20 (6th ed. 2008). 
17  Roger Lowenstein, Tax Break: Who Needs the Mortgage-Interest Deduction?, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Mar. 5, 2006, at 81. 
18  Id. 
19  Id. 
20  Steven C. Bourassa & William G. Grigsby, Income Tax Concessions for Owner-Occupied 
Housing, 11 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 521, 525 (2000). 
21  Lowenstein, supra note 17. 
22  Id. 
23  Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
24  JAMES S. EUSTICE ET AL., THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986: ANALYSIS AND
COMMENTARY ¶ 1.01[1], at 1-5 (1987). 
25  Id. ¶ 1.01[1], at 1-7. 
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for every form of economic activity.”26 The Tax Reform Act of 1986 included 
two major changes to the interest deduction of individual taxpayers: (1) the 
ability to deduct investment interest was limited to net investment income;27 
and (2) with few exceptions, interest on personal loans became nondeductible.28 
 A major exception to the general disallowance of a deduction for personal 
interest was qualified home mortgage interest.29 Taxpayers could continue to 
deduct personal interest on loans secured by a qualified residence, which in-
cluded the taxpayer’s principal residence and one other residence selected by 
the taxpayer.30 Generally, the qualified home mortgage interest deduction was 
limited to the lesser of the fair market value of the qualified residence or the 
indebtedness secured by the qualified residence to the extent of the purchase 
price plus cost of improvements.31 Interest on any portion of the indebtedness 
in excess of such amount was not deductible qualified residence interest unless 
the indebtedness was incurred for qualified educational or medical expenses.32 
If a married couple filed separately, each spouse could take into account only 
one of the residences, unless both spouses consented in writing to one spouse 
taking into account both residences.33 “Qualified residence interest may include 
interest paid by the taxpayer on debt secured by a residence of the taxpayer that 
he owns jointly or as a tenant in common, provided that all the requirements for 
qualified residence interest are met.”34 
26  Id. ¶ 1.02[4], at 1-21. 
27  Tax Reform Act sec. 511(a), § 163(d)(1) (amending I.R.C. § 163(d)). “Net investment 
income” is the excess of investment income over investment expenses. I.R.C. 
§ 163(d)(4)(A). “Investment income” is the sum of gross income from property held for in-
vestment and net gain attributable to the disposition of such property, to the extent not de-
rived from the conduct of a trade or business. Id. § 163(d)(4)(B). Investment interest, which
exceeds net investment income, is subject to an unlimited carryover and is deductible in fu-
ture years, subject to the investment interest limitation. Id. § 163(d)(2). Prior to the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986, a non-corporate taxpayer was permitted to deduct up to $10,000 of in-
vestment interest in excess of net investment income. Id. § 163(d)(1) (1982) (amended
1986). Congress strengthened the interest limitation to reduce the potential mismeasurement
of income from the deduction of investment interest in excess of investment income. JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, 100TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF
1986, at 263 (Comm. Print 1987).
28  Tax Reform Act sec. 511(b), § 163(h)(1) (adding “Disallowance of Deduction for Person-
al Interest of Individuals” to section 163 of the I.R.C.). 
29  Id. sec. 511(b), § 163(h)(2)(D). 
30  Id. sec. 511(b), § 163(h)(5)(A)(i). 
31  Id. sec. 511(b), § 163(h)(3)(B). 
32  Id. sec. 511(b), § 163 (h)(4)(A); see I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(C)(ii) (stating expenditures of the 
amount borrowed as home equity indebtedness are no longer limited to qualified educational 
or medical expenditures); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.163-10T(c)–(e) (1987) (providing meth-
ods and formulas for the allocation of indebtedness if the sum of the average balances for the 
tax year of all secured indebtedness on a qualified residence exceeds the adjusted purchase 
price). 
33  Tax Reform Act sec. 511(b), § 163(h)(5)(A)(ii). 
34  JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 27, at 267. 
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B. Revenue Act of 1987
 The Revenue Act of 1987 dramatically amended the provision allowing the
deduction of home mortgage interest.35 
       The bill amends the definition of qualified residence interest that is treated 
as deductible. Under the bill, qualified residence interest includes interest on ac-
quisition indebtedness and home equity indebtedness with respect to a principal 
and a second residence of the taxpayer. The maximum amount of home equity 
indebtedness is $100,000. The maximum amount of acquisition indebtedness is 
$1 million.36 
 “Qualified residence interest” includes interest paid on acquisition indebt-
edness and home equity indebtedness with respect to any qualified residence of 
the taxpayer.37 “Acquisition indebtedness” means any indebtedness incurred in 
the acquisition, construction, or substantial improvement of a qualified resi-
dence and refinanced indebtedness not in excess of the balance of the original 
acquisition indebtedness.38 “Home equity indebtedness” means any indebted-
ness, other than acquisition indebtedness, to the extent the amount of the in-
debtedness does not exceed the fair market value of a qualified residence re-
duced by the amount of any acquisition indebtedness.39 As to both acquisition 
indebtedness and home equity indebtedness, the indebtedness must be secured 
by the residence.40 The term “qualified residence” includes the principal resi-
dence41 of the taxpayer and one other residence selected by the taxpayer.42 Mar-
35  See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10102, 101 Stat. 
1330, 1330-384 to -386 (amending I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)). With respect to qualified residence 
interest, the law enacted in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 continued, except as otherwise mod-
ified by the Tax Revenue Act of 1987. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-391, pt. 2, at 802 (1987), as 
reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313, 2313-420. 
36  H.R. REP. NO. 100-391, at 1032. 
37 I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(A). See generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. NO. 936, HOME
MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION 2 (2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p936.pdf [http 
s://perma.cc/UX86-X8Y3]. 
38 I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(i).
39 Id. § 163(h)(3)(C)(i).
40 Qualified residence interest is interest on indebtedness “secured by a security interest val-
id against a subsequent purchaser . . . .” H.R. REP. NO. 100-391, at 1032. Indebtedness will 
be treated as secured by the taxpayer’s residence even though, “under any applicable State or 
local homestead or other debtor protection law . . . the security interest is ineffective or the 
enforceability of the security interest is restricted.” I.R.C. § 163(h)(4)(C). 
41  The term “principal residence” has the same meaning as provided in Treas. Reg. § 1.121. 
See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(C)(i) (exclusion of gain on the sale of a principal residence); see also 
Treas. Reg. § 1.121-1(b)(2) (2002) (stating that the residence the taxpayer uses the majority 
of the time is ordinarily the taxpayer’s principal residence and listing additional factors to 
consider, including: where the taxpayer is employed, files income tax returns, registers to 
vote, and registers a car; and where the taxpayer’s family, religious organizations, and recre-
ational clubs are located). 
42 I.R.C. § 163(h)(4)(A)(i). To qualify as a second residence, the term “residence” is defined
by reference to § 280A(d)(1), which requires the residence to be used by the taxpayer during 
the tax year for personal purposes for more than the greater of fourteen days or 10 percent of 
the days the residence is rented, unless it is not rented for any period during the tax year. Id. 
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ried taxpayers filing separately can each claim the interest on only one resi-
dence, unless both taxpayers consent in writing that one spouse can claim all of 
the interest on both residences.43 The definition of “residence” is broad enough 
to include a mobile home, boat, and a house trailer that contains a sleeping 
space, toilet, and cooking facilities.44  
 For each category of qualified residence interest, the Revenue Act of 1987 
imposed limitations as to the amount of indebtedness for which the interest is 
deductible.45 The maximum amount of acquisition indebtedness is limited to $1 
million ($500,000 in the case of married persons filing separate returns),46 and 
the maximum amount of home equity indebtedness is limited to $100,000 
($50,000 in the case of married persons filing separate returns).47 Interest on 
indebtedness in excess of the monetary limitations is nondeductible personal 
interest.48 The Committee Reports on the Revenue Act of 1987 summarized the 
monetary limitations as follows: 
Thus, under the bill, the total amount of a taxpayer’s home equity indebtedness 
with respect to his principal residence and a second residence, when combined 
with the amount of his acquisition indebtedness with respect to such residences, 
may not exceed a $1,100,000 overall limitation ($550,000, in the case of married 
individuals filing a separate return).49 
 In determining which debt (or portion thereof) exceeds the indebtedness 
limitations, the Committee Reports state, “until such [Treasury Regulations] are 
issued, a reasonable method of allocation must be used.”50 If the taxpayer in-
curred more than one mortgage loan to acquire and improve the residence and 
the mortgage loans have different interest rates, one possible method of alloca-
tion is to pro rate the $1 million ceiling between the first and second mortgag-
es.51 Another method of allocation is to approach the loan mortgages based on 
priorities, allowing a deduction for the interest on the first mortgage before al-
§ 163(h)(4)(A)(i)(II). If a taxpayer has more than one second home, the taxpayer may desig-
nate annually the one on which the mortgage interest is deductible. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-
10T(p)(3)(iv) (1987) (expounding the original version of Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-514, sec. 511(b), § 163(h)(4)(A)(i)(II), 100 Stat. 2085).
43 I.R.C. § 163(h)(4)(A)(ii).
44 Treas. Reg. § 1.163-10T(p)(3)(ii); see BORIS I. BITTKER ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS ¶ 22.02[1][b], at 22-6 (3d ed. 2002) (“Thus, interest on a sixty-
foot pleasure yacht may be deductible, while interest on a fifteen-foot pleasure fishing boat 
is nondeductible.”). 
45  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10102, 101 Stat. 
1330, 1330-384 to -386 (amending I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)). 
46 I.R.C. § 163(h)(1)(B)(ii).
47 Id. § 163(h)(3)(C)(ii). Expenditures of the amount borrowed as home equity indebtedness
are no longer limited to qualified educational or medical expenditures. H.R. REP. NO. 100-
391, pt. 2, at 1032 (1987). 
48  See H.R. REP. NO. 100-391, at 1032. 
49  Id. at 1033. 
50  Id. 
51  MCDANIEL ET AL., supra note 16, at 744. 
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lowing a deduction for the interest on the second mortgage, up to the $1 million 
maximum amount.52 The Committee Reports provided yet another method of 
allocation, “taking debt into account in the chronological order in which it was 
incurred or most recently refinanced, with the most recent debt (or portion 
thereof) treated as the amount of debt that exceeds the limit.”53 
II. OTHER RELEVANT ISSUES AFFECTING THE DEDUCTION OF QUALIFIED
RESIDENCE INTEREST 
 Before the question of whether a payment is qualified residence interest 
can be addressed, an initial determination must be made as to whether the pay-
ment is a payment of interest. The Supreme Court defined interest on indebted-
ness as “compensation for the use or forbearance of money.”54 With regard to 
mortgage loans, a distinction must be made between charges compensating the 
lender for the loan and charges compensating the lender for services performed 
in connection with the loan, for example, appraisal fees, title reports, title insur-
ance, and preparation of loan documents.55 Regardless of the label, “points” are 
considered interest for the purposes of Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”) sec-
tion 163 if the points are computed by reference to the amount and terms of the 
loan56 and if the points are not withheld from the loan proceeds.57  
 If the payment is a payment of interest, the next question is in which tax 
year the deduction can be taken. The cash method of accounting is used almost 
universally by individuals who are wage earners, employees, or other individu-
als performing personal services, such as doctors and lawyers.58 The cash 
method requires income to be reported in the tax year in which the income is 
52  Id. at 744–45. 
53  H.R. REP. NO. 100-391, at 1033. 
54  Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 498 (1940). 
55  Rev. Rul. 69-188, 1969-1 C.B. 54. 
56  See Rev. Rul. 72-315, 1972-1 C.B. 49. Typically, at the time of closing, home mortgage 
loans require the payment of prepaid interest in the form of a flat percentage of the loan 
principal, commonly termed “points.” MCDANIEL ET AL., supra note 16, at 748. 
57  See Rev. Rul. 69-188, 1969-1 C.B. 54.  
58  See BITTKER ET AL., supra note 44, ¶ 39.01[5], at 39-9. Permissible methods of tax ac-
counting include the cash receipts and disbursements method, and the accrual method. I.R.C. 
§ 446(c)(1)–(2). With exceptions, including qualified personal service corporations, I.R.C.
§ 448 proscribes the use of the cash method by corporations, partnerships with a corporation
as a partner, and tax shelters. Id. § 448(a).
[I]ncome is to be included for the taxable year when all the events have occurred that fix the
right to receive the income and the amount of the income can be determined with reasonable ac-
curacy. Under such a method, a liability is incurred, and generally is taken into account for Fed-
eral income tax purposes, in the taxable year in which all the events have occurred that establish
the fact of the liability, the amount of the liability can be determined with reasonable accuracy,
and economic performance has occurred with respect to the liability. . . . Applicable provisions
of the Code, the Income Tax Regulations, and other guidance published by the Secretary pre-
scribe the manner in which a liability that has been incurred is taken into account.
Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii)(A) (1960). 
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actually or constructively received,59 and deductions to be taken in the tax year 
in which payment is actually made.60 Generally, a cash method taxpayer cannot 
prepay deductible expenses and take a deduction for the prepaid amount in the 
tax year of payment.61 The Supreme Court held that such prepayments result in 
the creation of an asset with a life that extends beyond the tax year of payment 
and must be allocated to, and deducted in, the years benefited.62 
 I.R.C. section 461(g)(1) specifically defers a deduction for prepaid interest
by a cash-method taxpayer,63 requiring the taxpayer to capitalize and allocate 
the prepaid interest over the tax years in which the interest represents the cost 
of borrowed money.64 Although points are prepaid interest and, as such, deduct-
ible over the term of the loan, under I.R.C. section 461(g)(2), points paid to ac-
quire or improve the taxpayer’s principal residence may be deducted in the year 
paid.65 Assuming the points qualify as deductible interest under I.R.C. section 
163(h)(3), the points paid by a cash method taxpayer are deductible in the tax 
year paid if: (1) the loan is used to buy, build, or improve the taxpayer’s princi-
pal residence and the loan is secured by the residence; (2) the payment of points 
is an established business practice in the area where the loan is made; and (3) 
the points do not exceed the number of points generally charged in that area.66 
However, points paid to refinance a mortgage secured by the taxpayer’s princi-
pal residence are not deductible in full in the tax year paid and, therefore, must 
be deducted over the period of the new mortgage loan.67  
59  Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(i). Although not actually reduced to the taxpayer’s possession, 
constructive receipt occurs in the tax year in which income is either credited to an account, 
set apart, or otherwise made available to be drawn upon at any time. Id. § 1.451-2(a) (as 
amended in 1979). Although, under I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(A), “qualified residence interest” in-
cludes “interest which is paid or accrued” during the tax year, only interest actually paid dur-
ing the tax year, and not deferred interest capitalized onto principal, is deductible. See 
Smoker v. Comm’r, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1389 (2013). 
60  Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(i). 
61  Id. § 1.461-1(a)(1) (as amended in 1995). The deduction can be taken for the amount of 
the expenditure allocable to the tax year of the payment. Id. 
62  See generally INDOPCO, Inc., v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79 (1992). 
63  See Rev. Proc. 94-27, 1994-1 C.B. 613 (setting forth safe harbor rules for the deductibility 
of points paid in connection with the acquisition of a principal residence). 
64 I.R.C. § 461(g)(1).
65 Id. § 461(g)(2).
66 Id.; see Rev. Proc. 92-12, 1992-1 C.B. 663 (listing the requirements that must be satisfied
by a cash method taxpayer for points incurred in connection with the purchase of the taxpay-
er’s principal residence to be fully deductible in the tax year paid) (superseded by Rev. Proc. 
94-27, 1994-1 C.B. 613); see also Schubel v. Comm’r, 77 T.C. 701, 703–04, 707 (1981)
(holding that points withheld from the loan principal disbursement, and not paid separately
from the taxpayer’s own funds, were not “paid” within the meaning of I.R.C. § 461(g)(2),
therefore, not currently deductible).
67  Rev. Rul. 87-22, 1987-1 C.B. 146. In refinancing the home mortgage, any points paid in 
respect to any additional indebtedness incurred in connection with the improvement of the 
taxpayer’s principal residence is deductible in the tax year paid. Id. 
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 If a payment meets the requirements of qualified residence interest, the in-
terest deduction is an itemized deduction.68 However, if the standard deduction 
is larger than the taxpayer’s aggregate itemized deductions, the taxpayer will 
deduct the standard deduction in computing taxable income.69 In such circum-
stance, the deduction for home mortgage interest is not reflected in the taxpay-
er’s taxable income. If the taxpayer does elect to itemize deductions, the quali-
fied residence interest deduction is not a “[m]iscellaneous itemized 
deduction[],”70 and, therefore, not subject to the 2 percent of adjusted gross in-
come floor under I.R.C. section 67.71 Nevertheless, qualified residence interest 
is subject to the overall limitation on itemized deductions under I.R.C. section 
68.72  
 Finally, for purposes of the alternative minimum tax (“A.M.T.”), the de-
duction of qualified residence interest is significantly restricted. The interest on 
a home mortgage is deductible for A.M.T. purposes only if the mortgage is tak-
en out to acquire, construct, or substantially improve a taxpayer’s principal res-
idence or a qualified dwelling of the taxpayer.73 Effectively, interest on second 
mortgages and home equity loans is not deductible for A.M.T. purposes unless 
the proceeds are used for substantial home improvements.74 
III. REVENUE RULING 2010-25
 In Revenue Ruling 2010-25, the Service interpreted the definition of “qual-
ified residence interest.”75 The holding maximized a taxpayer’s qualified resi-
dence interest deduction on the acquisition of a qualified residence.76 In taking 
68 I.R.C. § 63(d); see id. § 62(a) (listing the deductions of an individual allowable in compu-
ting adjusted gross income). 
69  See id. § 63(b). 
70  Id. § 67(b). 
71  Id. § 67(a). 
72  See I.R.C. § 68(a). Generally, a taxpayer whose adjusted gross income exceeds a thresh-
old amount must reduce the amount of allowable itemized deductions by the lesser of: (1) “3 
percent of the excess of adjusted gross income over the [threshold] amount,” or (2) eighty 
percent of the otherwise allowable itemized deductions. Id. The three deductions not subject 
to the overall limitation on itemized deductions are: “(1) [any] deduction[s] under section 
213 (relating to medical, etc. expenses), (2) any deduction for investment interest (as defined 
in section 163(d)),” and (3) any deductions under I.R.C. § 165(c)(2), (3) and (d) (relating to 
casualty, theft, and wagering losses). Id. § 68(c).  
73  Id. § 56(e)(1). The term “principal residence” is within the meaning of I.R.C. § 121 (ex-
clusion of gain on the sale of a principal residence), and the term qualified dwelling within 
the meaning of I.R.C. § 163(h)(4) (definition of a qualified residence for the purposes of the 
home mortgage interest deduction). Id. § 56(e)(1)(A)–(B). 
74  See id. § 56(e)(1)–(2). 
75  Rev. Rul. 2010-25, 2010-44 I.R.B. 571. 
76  See id. 
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this position, the Service stated it would not follow the Tax Court’s decision in 
Pau v. Commissioner.77 
A. Pau v. Commissioner
In Pau v. Commissioner, the Tax Court considered whether the $1,000,000
limitation on acquisition indebtedness restricted the amount of the taxpayers’ 
deductible qualified residence interest.78 In 1989, taxpayers, who were a mar-
ried couple, purchased a residence in Hillsborough, California, for $1,780,000, 
with an original mortgage amount of $1,330,000.79 In 1990, taxpayers claimed 
a qualified residence interest deduction for interest paid on $1,100,000 of in-
debtedness.80 The Service allowed the taxpayers a deduction but limited the 
amount of the deduction to the interest paid on $1 million of indebtedness.81 
The taxpayers used the residence as their principal residence at all times.82  
 Because the acquisition indebtedness incurred exceeded the $1 million lim-
itation, the Tax Court held the taxpayers could not deduct the interest on the 
additional $100,000 as home equity indebtedness.83 The taxpayers failed to 
demonstrate that the indebtedness in excess of the $1 million limitation was in-
curred in acquiring, constructing, or substantially improving their residence.84 
The taxpayers also failed to demonstrate that any part of the $100,000 excess 
indebtedness was home equity indebtedness.85 In support of the holding, the 
Tax Court quoted I.R.C. section 163(h)(3)(C)(i), “home equity indebtedness is 
defined as ‘any indebtedness (other than acquisition indebtedness) secured by a 
qualified residence.’ ”86 
B. Chief Counsel Advice 200940030
 The Service, in Chief Counsel Advice (“C.C.A.”) 200940030, addressed
the issue of whether indebtedness incurred to acquire a qualified residence in 
excess of $1 million limitation could constitute home equity indebtedness.87 In 
77  Id. The Service also stated that it would not follow the decision of Catalano v. Commis-
sioner. See Catalano v. Comm’r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1632, 1636 (2000) (following the Pau 
decision that the amount of deductible residence mortgage interest was restricted to the in-
terest paid on $1 million of acquisition indebtedness), rev’d, 279 F.3d 682 (9th Cir. 2002).  
78  Pau v. Comm’r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 1819, 1819 (1997). 
79  Id. at 1819, 1823. 
80  Id. at 1823. 
81  Id. 
82  Id. 
83  Id. at 1826. 
84  Id. 
85  Id. 
86  Id. (emphasis in original).  
87  Memorandum No. 200940030 from Christopher F. Kane, Branch Chief of Income Tax & 
Accounting, Internal Revenue Serv. Office of Chief Counsel, to Samuel Berman, Special 
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addressing this question, C.C.A. 200940030 considered a taxpayer who pur-
chased a principal residence for $1.5 million; the taxpayer paid $200,000 cash 
and borrowed the remaining $1.3 million through a loan secured by the resi-
dence.88 
 The Service noted that the definition of home equity indebtedness is in-
debtedness, other than acquisition indebtedness, secured by the residence sub-
ject to fair market value and $100,000 limitations.89 As stated by the Service, 
“the resolution of the issue depends on the definition of ‘acquisition indebted-
ness,’ ”90 which has two possible interpretations.91 “Under the first interpreta-
tion, acquisition indebtedness means all indebtedness, regardless of amount, 
incurred to acquire, construct, or substantially improve a qualified residence.”92 
Under this interpretation, the $1 million indebtedness limitation is not an ele-
ment of the definition but a separate limit on deductibility, and, as such, any 
indebtedness in excess of $1 million remains acquisition indebtedness.93 
 Under the second interpretation, the $1 million indebtedness limitation is 
part of the definition of acquisition indebtedness.94 Under this interpretation, a 
taxpayer who borrows in excess of $1 million to acquire, construct, or substan-
tially improve the residence may deduct the excess as home equity indebted-
ness because the excess is not acquisition indebtedness.95 As a result, the tax-
payer can deduct the interest on a total of $1.1 million of qualified residence 
interest incurred in the acquisition, construction, and improvement of a quali-
fied residence, assuming compliance with the other requirements of I.R.C. sec-
tion 163(h)(3)(B) and (C).96 The Service concluded that the second interpreta-
tion was the better statutory interpretation of the terms “acquisition 
indebtedness” and “home equity indebtedness.”97 
 In addition, the Service found that the second interpretation best comports 
with how the term “acquisition indebtedness” is used in other sections of the 
Internal Revenue Code;98 I.R.C. section 163(h)(3)(A), which defines “qualified 
residence interest,” would be rendered meaningless if the $1 million and 
$100,000 limitations are not included in the definition of acquisition indebted-
ness and home equity indebtedness.99 I.R.C. section 108(h)(2) provides for ex-
Counsel of Small Business/Self-Employed, Internal Revenue Serv. (Aug. 7, 2009) [hereinaf-
ter C.C.A. 200940030]. 
88  Id. at 2. 
89  Id. at 2–3. 
90  Id. at 2. 
91  Id. at 3. 
92  Id. (emphasis added). 
93  Id. 
94  Id. 
95  Id. 
96  See id. at 2–3. 
97  Id. at 3. 
98  Id. 
99  Id. 
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clusion of cancellation of indebtedness income on the discharge of qualified 
principal residence indebtedness. 100 This provision adopts, as the definition of 
“qualified principal residence indebtedness,” the definition of acquisition in-
debtedness, citing I.R.C. section 163(h)(3)(B), with the substitution of a $2 mil-
lion indebtedness limitation.101 The increase in limitation amount is necessary 
only if the definition of the term acquisition indebtedness includes the $1 mil-
lion indebtedness limitation.102 Finally, for the purposes of A.M.T. under I.R.C. 
section 56(e), “qualified housing interest” is defined, in part, as qualified resi-
dence interest under I.R.C. section 163(h)(3) paid during the tax year on in-
debtedness incurred in acquiring, constructing, or substantially improving the 
principal residence or a qualified dwelling of the taxpayer.103 Clearly, the con-
gressional intent was not to allow a deduction for A.M.T. purposes without a 
limitation.104  
C. Revenue Ruling 2010-25
 In Revenue Ruling 2010-25, the Service ruled that indebtedness incurred
by a taxpayer in acquiring, constructing, or substantially improving a qualified 
residence could constitute home equity indebtedness to the extent the indebted-
ness exceeded $1 million, subject to the $100,000 and fair market value limita-
tions.105 In 2009, an unmarried taxpayer purchased a principal residence for 
$1.5 million, paying $300,000 and financing the remainder of the purchase 
price through a loan secured by the residence.106 Without reference to C.C.A. 
200940030, the Service held that the taxpayer could deduct interest paid on an 
aggregate indebtedness of $1.1 million as qualified residence interest: 
       Under § 163(h)(3)(A), the interest on both acquisition indebtedness and 
home equity indebtedness is qualified residence interest. Therefore, for 2009 
Taxpayer may deduct interest paid on indebtedness of $1,100,000 as qualified 
residence interest. Any interest Taxpayer paid on the remaining indebtedness of 
$100,000 is nondeductible personal interest under § 163(h).107  
100  Id.; see I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(E) (2012). 
101 C.C.A. 200940030, supra note 87, at 4; see I.R.C. § 108(h)(2).
102 C.C.A. 200940030, supra note 87, at 4. The discharge of qualified principal residence
indebtedness was excluded from gross income under I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(E), and was extend-
ed through December 31, 2016. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-
113, § 151(a), 129 Stat. 2242, 3065 (2015). 
103 C.C.A. 200940030, supra note 87, at 4.
104 See id. at 5.
105 Rev. Rul. 2010-25, 2010-44 I.R.B. 571.
106 Id.
107 Id.
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IV. QUALIFIED RESIDENCE INTEREST AND UNMARRIED CO-OWNERS
Whether same sex or opposite sex, unmarried couples often take joint title 
to dwelling units used as a principal resident or as a second residence.108 Indi-
viduals, who are not a couple, also may co-own dwelling units used as a princi-
pal residence or as a second residence.109 For example, second homes located in 
recreational areas may be owned by several families or residences located in 
areas of the country with high property values may be owned by multiple fami-
lies.110 Whatever the circumstance, whether the statutory limits on acquisition 
indebtedness and home equity indebtedness apply to unmarried co-owners on a 
per-residence basis or a per-taxpayer basis makes a significant difference in the 
taxpayer’s ultimate tax liability.111  
 Recently, the Service and the courts have provided conflicting interpreta-
tions of the indebtedness limitations included in the definitions of “acquisition 
indebtedness” and “home equity indebtedness.”112 Acquisition indebtedness is 
defined by statute as any indebtedness that is incurred in (or indebtedness re-
sulting from the refinancing of indebtedness incurred in) acquiring, construct-
ing, or substantially improving a qualified residence and is secured by the resi-
dence.113 Acquisition indebtedness is limited to an aggregate amount of 
indebtedness not to exceed $1 million ($500,000 in the case of a married per-
son filing a separate return).114 Home equity indebtedness is defined by statute 
as any indebtedness (other than acquisition indebtedness) to the extent that the 
fair market value of a qualified residence exceeds the amount of the acquisition 
indebtedness on the residence.115 Home equity indebtedness is limited to an ag-
gregate amount of indebtedness not to exceed $100,000 ($50,000 in the case of 
a married person filing a separate return).116  
A. The Marriage Bonus and the Marriage Penalty
 Marriage often affects tax liability of a couple, resulting in a marriage
penalty (an increase in tax liability) or a marriage bonus (a decrease in tax lia-
bility). In fact, a marriage penalty was embedded in the Revenue Act of 1913, 
which allowed a personal exemption of $3,000 for a single individual and 
$4,000 for married individuals.117 In 1948, a significant marriage bonus was 
108  Brief for Professor Patricia Cain et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, at 10, 
Voss v. Comm’r, 796 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2015) (Nos. 12-73257, 12-73261). 
109  Id. 
110  Id. 
111  See generally id. at 10–13. 
112  See supra Part III. 
113 I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(i) (2012).
114 Id. § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii).
115 Id. § 163(h)(3)(C)(i).
116 Id. § 163(h)(3)(C)(ii).
117 Robert S. McIntyre & Michael J. McIntyre, Fixing the “Marriage Penalty” Problem, 33
VAL. U. L. REV. 907, 908 n.4 (1999). Single taxpayers with income greater than $3,000 and 
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created by the adoption of a separate rate schedule for married couples filing a 
joint return.118 The joint return is a form of income splitting enacted to alleviate 
the tax disparity between community property states and common law states.119 
Often, joint filing results in a marriage bonus, which is greatest if one spouse is 
the sole or primary income earner.120 In response to criticism of the marriage 
bonus created by the joint return, in 1951, Congress enacted a special rate 
schedule for heads of household and, in 1954, allowed surviving spouses to use 
the joint return rates for two years following the deceased spouse’s death.121 
Due to continuing complaints, in 1969, Congress enacted a new rate schedule 
for unmarried individuals, which created a marriage penalty for married indi-
viduals who earn relatively equal amounts of income.122  
 Even though one of the spouses has neither income or deductions, married 
individuals may file a single return jointly if the following requirements are 
met:  
(1) they are married at the close of the taxable year or, if one dies before the
close of the table year, at the time of the decedent’s death; (2) neither spouse is a
nonresident alien at any time during the taxable year; and (3) husband and wife
have the same taxable year, with an exception for different table years resulting
from death.123
If a joint return is filed, the income and deductions of the couple are computed 
on an aggregate basis, with each spouse being jointly and severally liable for 
any taxes due.124 If married individuals file separate returns, each spouse re-
                                                                                                                                 
married taxpayers with income greater than $4,000 were subject to a 1 percent tax rate. Act 
of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, §§ II(A)(1), II(C), 38 Stat. 114, 166, 168. High-income taxpayers 
were subject to an additional tax that resulted in progressive, combined rates of 1 percent to 
6 percent. Id. § II(A)(2). The $3,000 and $4,000 exemption amounts adjust for inflation; this 
is equivalent to $66,100 and $88,100, respectively, in 2010. See generally CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: MARRIAGE AND THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (1997) (ex-
amining the ways in which federal tax law affects the income taxes that married couples pay 
and how demographic and labor market changes have altered those effects). 
118  Ellen D. Cook, No Simple Solution for the Marriage Penalty Quandary, 64 PRAC. TAX 
STRATEGIES 160, 161 (2000). 
119  BITTKER ET AL., supra note 44, ¶ 44.02[2], at 44-19. Generally, income is taxed to the 
earner thereof, and the basic principal of the community property system is that each spouse 
has a present interest in one half of the couple’s income from personal services or from 
community property; therefore, one half of the couple’s community income for the tax year 
is taxable to each spouse. See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 116–17 (1930) (citing Lucas v. 
Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930)). 
120  BITTKER ET AL., supra note 44, ¶ 44.02[5], at 44-28. 
121  Id. 
122  See id. ¶ 44.02[5], at 44-28 to -29 (discussing additional legislation enacted by Congress 
to alleviate the marriage penalty). See generally MCDANIEL ET AL., supra note 16, at 1310 
(discussing competing and conflicting policy objectives in the choice of taxable units). 
123 I.R.C. § 6013(a) (2012); BITTKER ET AL., supra note 44, ¶ 44.02[2][a], at 44-21.
124 See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3).
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ports the income and deductions generated by that spouse.125 The determination 
of whether an individual is married is made as of the close of the individual’s 
tax year.126 
 In recent years, considerable interest has been directed at alleviating or 
eliminating the marriage penalty.127 However, any legislative reform aimed at 
relieving the marriage penalty in order to benefit two-earner couples have been 
attacked as unfair to one-earner couples, unmarried taxpayers, or both.128 Effec-
tive as of 2012, the marriage penalty was removed from the 10 and 15 percent 
tax brackets and the standard deduction.129 Nevertheless, the marriage penalty 
is still embedded in the other tax brackets, and in the many threshold and phase 
out amounts found throughout the I.R.C.130 A recent example of the continu-
ance of the marriage penalty is I.R.C. section 1411, which imposes a 3.8 per-
cent tax on net investment income,131 allows an untaxed threshold amount of 
$250,000 for joint filers, and $200,000 for all other filers.132 Other sections of 
the I.R.C. that contain a marriage penalty include, but are not limited to: I.R.C. 
section 1(h) (20 percent capital gains rate on high-income taxpayers); I.R.C. 
section 24 (child care credit); I.R.C. section 32 (earned income credit); I.R.C. 
section 68 (overall limitation on itemized deductions); I.R.C. section 86 (taxa-
tion of social security benefits); I.R.C. 151 (deduction for personal exemp-
tions); and I.R.C. section 1211 (deduction of net capital losses).133 
125  BITTKER ET AL., supra note 44, ¶ 44.02[2][c], at 44-24. 
126 I.R.C. § 7703(a)(1). If the individual’s spouse dies during the tax year, the determination
of whether an individual is married is made on the date of the spouse’s death. Id. Individuals 
legally separated from their spouse under a decree of divorce or legal separation are not con-
sidered married for federal income tax purposes. Id. § 7703(a)(2). If the taxpayer’s spouse is 
not a member of the household during the last six months of the tax year, a married taxpayer 
filing a separate return is treated as unmarried for the purposes of determining the taxpayer’s 
entitlement to personal exemptions and head of household status. Id. § 7703(b)(3). See gen-
erally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (holding that Section 3 of the De-
fense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 21419 (1996), limiting the meaning of 
the words “marriage” to a legal union between one man and one woman and “spouse” to a 
person of the opposite sex, is an unconstitutional denial of equal protection in violation of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment); Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201 
(holding, for federal tax purposes, the marital status of an individual of the same sex who is 
lawfully married under the law of the state that recognizes such marriages will be recog-
nized). 
127  BITTKER ET AL., supra note 44, ¶ 44.02[5], at 44-30. 
128  Id. 
129  See id. ¶ 44.02[5], at S44-16 (Supp. II 2016). 
130  See Cook, supra note 118, at 165–66. 
131  Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 
§ 1411(a)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 1029, 1061 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1411(a)(1)(A)
(2012)).
132 I.R.C. § 1411(b). The 3.8 percent tax is imposed on the lesser of: (1) net investment in-
come for the tax year; or (2) the taxpayer’s modified adjusted gross income for the tax year 
over the threshold amount. Id. § 1411(a)(1)(A)–(B). 
133 I.R.C. §§ 1(h), 24, 32, 68, 86, 151, 1211.
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B. Chief Counsel Advice 200911007
 In C.C.A. 200911007, the Service addressed the issue of how to apply the
$1 million limitation on acquisition indebtedness where the taxpayer is a partial 
owner of the residence for which the total acquisition indebtedness exceeds $1 
million.134 The taxpayer financed the acquisition of a residence by obtaining a 
loan in excess of $1 million, secured by the residence.135 The next year, the 
taxpayer transferred the residence to himself and a co-owner as joint tenants, 
who was added as an additional obligor on the mortgage.136 Both the taxpayer 
and the co-owner used the residence as their principal residence.137 For the first 
two tax years at issue, the taxpayer paid all of the interest due on the mortgage 
and, during the third tax year, the taxpayer and the co-owner each paid a per-
centage of the interest due on the mortgage.138 For the third tax year, the tax-
payer argued that the $1 million indebtedness limitation on acquisition indebt-
edness should be interpreted to allow a $1 million limitation for each the 
taxpayer and the co-owner.139 
 In response, the Service stated that the plain language of the statute did not 
support this interpretation.140 Under I.R.C. section 163(h)(3)(B)(i), “acquisition 
indebtedness is defined [] as indebtedness incurred in acquiring a qualified res-
idence of the taxpayer—not as indebtedness incurred in acquiring taxpayer’s 
portion of a qualified residence.”141 “The entire amount of indebtedness in-
curred in acquiring the qualified residence constitutes acquisition indebtedness 
under I.R.C. section 163(h)(3)(A)(i). . . . However, under I.R.C. section 
163(h)(3)(B)(ii), the amount treated as acquisition indebtedness for purposes of 
the qualified residence interest deduction is limited to $1,000,000. . .”142 In 
support, the Service noted the parenthetical language in I.R.C. section 
163(h)(3)(B)(ii), which limits the amount treated as acquisition indebtedness to 
$500,000 for a married taxpayer filing a separate return.143  
134  Memorandum No. 200911007 from John P. Moriarty, Chief of Income Tax & Account-
ing Branch 1, Internal Revenue Serv. Office of Chief Counsel, to Catherine G. Chang, Att’y, 
San Francisco, Internal Revenue Serv., at 2 (Nov. 24, 2008) hereinafter C.C.A. 200911007]. 
135  Id. 
136  Id. 
137  Id. 
138  Id. 
139  Id. at 4. 
140  Id.  
141  Id. (emphasis in original).  
142  Id. As the legal and equitable owner of the property, the taxpayer was entitled to deduct 
the interest actually paid on the mortgage. Id. at 3. If the average balance of the indebtedness 
exceeds the indebtedness limitation, the amount of deductible qualified residence interest 
with respect to the indebtedness is determined by multiplying the interest paid with respect 
to the debt by a fraction, the numerator of which is the applicable indebtedness limitation 
and the denominator of which is the average balance of the indebtedness. Id. at 4 (citing 
Treas. Reg. § 1.163-10T(e) (1987)). 
143  Id. at 4. 
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 The Service concluded that the $1 million indebtedness limitation is used 
to determine the portion of the qualified residence interest that the taxpayer 
may be deducted.144 The formula for determining the amount of qualified resi-
dence interest deductible by the taxpayer is as follows: multiply the amount of 
interest actually paid by the taxpayer by a fraction, the numerator of which is 
$1 million and the denominator of which is the average balance of the outstand-
ing acquisition indebtedness in the tax year at issue.145  
C. Sophy v. Commissioner
 In Sophy v. Commissioner, the Tax Court considered the question of
whether the statutory limitations on acquisition indebtedness and home equity 
indebtedness should be applied to unmarried co-owners on a per-residence or 
per-taxpayer basis.146 Charles J. Sophy and Bruce H. Voss were domestic part-
ners registered with the State of California.147 Between 2000 and 2002, the tax-
payers purchased residences in Rancho Mirage, California, and Beverly Hills, 
California.148 Both residences were financed and refinanced with indebtedness 
secured by the residences for which the taxpayers were jointly and severally 
liable.149 The taxpayers took title to the residences as joint tenants.150 During 
the tax years at issue, the taxpayers used the Beverly Hills residence as their 
principal residence and the Rancho Mirage residence as their second resi-
dence.151 In 2006 and 2007, the total average balance for the home mortgages 
and home equity lines of credit was $2,703,568 and $2,669,136, respectively.152 
 For tax years 2006 and 2007, the taxpayers each filed separate federal in-
come tax returns and each claimed a home mortgage interest deduction under 
I.R.C. section 163(h)(3).153 Their sole contention was that the $1 million and
$100,000 indebtedness limitations apply to a residence co-owned by unmarried
individuals on a per-taxpayer basis.154 The Service’s position was that the in-
debtedness limitations apply on a per-residence basis, regardless of the number
144  Id. at 2.  
145  Id. at 4 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.163-10T(e) (1987)). 
146  Sophy v. Comm’r, 138 T.C. 204, 209 (2012), rev’d, Voss v. Comm’r, 796 F.3d 1051 (9th 
Cir. 2015). 
147  Voss, 796 F.3d at 1055. “Domestic partners are two adults who have chosen to share one 
another’s lives in an intimate and committed relationship of mutual caring.” CAL. FAM. CODE 
§ 297(a) (2012); see also id. §§ 297–299.6 (providing the rules applicable to domestic part-
ners and domestic partnerships).
148  Sophy, 138 T.C. at 205. 
149  Id. at 205–06. 
150  Id. at 205. 
151  Id. at 206. 
152  Id. 
153  Id. at 206–07. 
154  Id. at 209; see supra Part III (discussing the Service’s position in C.C.A. 200940030 and 
Revenue Ruling 2010-25, which allows for the aggregation of the indebtedness limitations 
upon the acquisition, construction, or substantial improvement of a qualified residence). 
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of owners and whether or not the co-owners are married to each other.155 Fol-
lowing the reasoning of C.C.A. 200911007,156 the co-owners were collectively 
limited to a deduction for qualified mortgage interest paid on a maximum of 
$1.1 million of acquisition and home equity indebtedness.157 The Service com-
puted the limitation ratio as $1.1 million over the average balance of the quali-
fying loans.158 The limitation ratio was then multiplied by the amount of quali-
fied mortgage interest paid by each taxpayer during the tax year to arrive at the 
amount of deductible interest.159 Each taxpayer filed a petition with the Tax 
Court, and the two cases were consolidated.160  
 In Sophy, after reviewing the language of the statute and the legislative in-
tent, the Tax Court concluded that the indebtedness limitations are properly ap-
plied on a per-residence basis.161 The analysis began with a close examination 
of the definitions of “acquisition indebtedness” and “home equity indebted-
ness,” noting that the word “taxpayer” is not used in relation to either type of 
indebtedness.162 Further, in defining “qualified residence interest,” the terms 
“acquisition indebtedness” and “home equity indebtedness” focus on the indi-
vidual taxpayer only with regard to the qualified residence and not to the in-
debtedness.163 Congress’s use of the phrase “any indebtedness” without the 
phrase being qualified by language referring to an individual taxpayer led to the 
conclusion by the Tax Court that the focus of the statutory limitations is the 
amount of indebtedness with respect to the residence rather than the amount of 
indebtedness with respect to the individual taxpayer.164 
155  Sophy, 138 T.C. at 209; see also Bronstein v. Comm’r, 138 T.C. 382, 382–83 (2012) 
(holding that a married woman, filing separately, with title to her principal residence held in 
her name and the name of her father-in-law, was limited to qualified residence interest on 
$550,000 of acquisition indebtedness and home equity indebtedness). 
156  Sophy, 138 T.C. at 206–07; see also supra Part IV B (discussing the Service’s position in 
C.C.A. 200911007 that the acquisition indebtedness limitation applies on a per-residence
basis).
157  Sophy, 138 T.C. at 209. 
158  Id. at 207. 
159  Id. 
160  Id. at 204–05. 
161  Id. at 213. In interpreting the statute, the Tax Court began by stating that its purpose was 
to give effect to Congress’s intent, and that the statutory language was the most persuasive 
evidence of statutory purpose. Id. at 209. The Tax Court then listed several rules of statutory 
interpretation: (1) “the words of the statute should be construed in their ordinary, everyday, 
and plain meaning;” (2) “usually the meaning of the statutory language is conclusive;” (3) if 
a statute is silent or ambiguous, the statute’s legislative history may be considered in an at-
tempt to determine congressional intent; and (4) if a statute appears clear on its face, une-
quivocal evidence of legislative purpose is necessary before interpreting the statute contrary 
to its plain meaning. Id. at 209–10. 
162  Id. at 210. 
163  Id. The home equity indebtedness is also “reduced by the amount of acquisition indebt-
edness with respect to such residence.” Id. (emphasis omitted). 
164  Id. at 210–11. 
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 The Tax Court relied on several rules of statutory construction to further 
dispel the taxpayer’s per-taxpayer interpretation of the statue. First, if Congress 
uses language in one section of a statute but not another section of the same 
statute, the presumption is that the omission by Congress is intentional and 
purposeful.165 Although Congress refers to the “taxpayer” several times in 
I.R.C. section 163(h), no reference to an individual taxpayer is made in the in-
debtedness limitation language.166 Second, a statute should be construed to pre-
vent a clause, sentence, or word from being superfluous, void, or insignifi-
cant.167 Congress’s repeated use of phrases such as “with respect to any
qualified residence” and “with respect to such residence” in conjunction with
terms, which, by their own definitions, already relate to a qualified residence,
would be superfluous if the indebtedness limitations were applied on a per-
taxpayer basis.168 Third, a statute must be construed not in isolation but as part
of a statutory scheme.169 With I.R.C. section 163(h)(3) taken as a whole, Con-
gress’s repeated references to such phrases “emphasize the point that qualified
residence interest and the related indebtedness limitations are residence focused
rather than taxpayer focused.”170
 Finally, the Tax Court found support for applying the indebtedness limita-
tions on a per-residence basis in the parenthetical language addressing married 
persons filing separate returns.171 In the case of a married individual filing a 
separate return, the parenthetical language limits acquisition indebtedness to 
$500,000 and home equity indebtedness to $50,000.172 This language suggests, 
“without expressly stating, that co-owners who are married to each other and 
file a joint return are limited to a deduction of interest on $1 million of acquisi-
tion indebtedness and $100,000 of home equity indebtedness.”173 The Tax 
Court found unpersuasive the taxpayers’ argument that this parenthetical lan-
guage, which creates a marriage penalty, does not apply to unmarried co-
owners in light of the residence-focused language of I.R.C. section 163(h)(3) 
and the absence of any reference to an individual taxpayer in the indebtedness 
limitations.174 Rather than establishing a marriage penalty, the Tax Court rea-
soned the parenthetical language merely implies that unmarried co-owners may 
allocate the indebtedness limitation amounts in a different manner, such as ac-
cording to percentage of ownership.175 
165  Id. at 211. 
166  Id. 
167  Id. 
168  Id. 
169  Id. at 211–12. 
170  Id. at 212. 
171  Id. 
172  Id. 
173  Id. 
174  Id. 
175  Id. at 213. 
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D. Voss v. Commissioner
 In Voss v. Commissioner, the Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court’s deci-
sion in Sophy.176 The Ninth Circuit was called upon to decide an issue of first 
impression: whether the acquisition indebtedness limitation and the home equi-
ty indebtedness limitation apply on a per-taxpayer basis or a per-residence basis 
if the qualified residence is owned by multiple unmarried taxpayers.177 Infer-
ring from the statute’s treatment of married taxpayers filing separate returns, 
the Ninth Circuit held that the indebtedness limitations on qualified residence 
interest apply to unmarried co-owners on a per-taxpayer basis.178 Thus, each 
co-owner is entitled to an aggregate $1.1 million indebtedness limitation 
amount.179 Before reviewing the applicable statutory language, the Ninth Cir-
cuit noted that “[s]ection 163 of the Internal Revenue Code governs the deduct-
ibility of interest on a taxpayer’s indebtedness. This section of the Tax Code, 
like much of the Code, is complex—it requires attention to definitions within 
definitions and exceptions upon exceptions.”180 
 The Ninth Circuit began by stating that Congress could have drafted the 
statute to make clear whether the indebtedness limitations apply to unmarried 
co-owners of a qualified residence on a per-taxpayer basis or a per-residence 
basis.181 Although the statute is silent on this point, the Ninth Circuit noted that 
it was not entirely without textual guidance.182 The statute is clear as to the ap-
plication of the indebtedness limitations to one type of co-ownership that of 
married individuals filing separate returns.183 Both indebtedness limitations 
contain parenthetical language that allows only 50 percent of the indebtedness 
limitation amounts “in the case of a married individual filing a separate re-
turn.”184 Congress’s use of the phrase “in the case of” suggests that the paren-
theticals are exceptions to the general indebtedness limitations.185 This lan-
guage also suggests “parallelism between the parenthetical language and the 
main clause of that provision.”186 The Ninth Circuit stated that the parenthetical 
176  Voss v. Comm’r, 796 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015). 
177  Id. at 1057. 
178  Id. at 1057–59. 
179  Id. at 1068; see supra Part III B (discussing the Service’s position in C.C.A. 200940030 
and Revenue Ruling 2010-25, which allows the aggregation of the indebtedness limitations 
upon the acquisition, construction, or substantial improvement of a qualified residence). If a 
taxpayer’s total mortgage indebtedness exceeds the limitations, the Tax Court provides the 
“usual” method for calculating qualified residence interest: multiply the total interest paid by 
a ratio of the statutory indebtedness limitation over total indebtedness. Voss, 796 F.3d at 
1054 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.163-10T(e) (1987)). 
180  Voss, 796 F.3d at 1053. 
181  Id. at 1058–59. 
182  Id. at 1058. 
183  Id. 
184  Id. (quoting I.C.R. § 163(h)(3)(B) (2012)). 
185  Id. 
186  Id. 
Fall 2016] QUALIFIED RESIDENCE INTEREST DEDUCTION 221 
language offers three useful insights into the interpretation of the general in-
debtedness limitations.187 
 First, the parenthetical language clearly speaks in per-taxpayer terms in re-
ferring to a “married individual,” even though married individuals commonly 
co-own their homes and are jointly and severally liable on any mortgage.188 
This per-taxpayer wording, along with the phrase “in the case of,” suggests that 
the wording of the main clause, especially the phrase “aggregate amount treat-
ed,” should be applied in a per-taxpayer manner.189 
 Second, the parenthetical language not only speaks in per-taxpayer terms 
but also operates in a per-taxpayer manner.190 Each spouse filing a separate re-
turn is subject to aggregate indebtedness limitations of $550,000;191 thus, 
spouses filing jointly are subject to an aggregate indebtedness limitations of 
$1.1 million, which are the indebtedness limitations for a single taxpayer.192 
The parentheticals do not subject both spouses jointly to aggregate indebted-
ness limitations of $550,000 but “ensur[e] that a married couple filing separate 
returns is treated the same as a couple filing a joint return.”193 Both the Service 
and the Tax Court agree that the parenthetical limitations apply on a per-spouse 
basis; therefore, the indebtedness limitations for unmarried individuals should 
also apply on a per-taxpayer basis.194 
 Third, the very inclusion of the parenthetical suggests that the indebtedness 
limitations apply on a per-taxpayer basis.195 Applying the rule of statutory con-
struction that a statute should not be interpreted in a way that renders a provi-
sion superfluous,196 the Ninth Circuit concluded that the parenthetical language 
would be superfluous if the indebtedness limitations applied on a per-residence 
basis.197 In that case, the parenthetical limiting two spouses filing separately to 
an indebtedness limitation of $550,000 each would be unnecessary.198 The Tax 
Court’s reasoning that Congress included the parenthetical language to estab-
lish a 50 percent allocation of the indebtedness limitations amount was unper-
suasive.199 Congress’s inclusion of the parenthetical language merely to prevent 
spouses from otherwise allocating indebtedness limitation amounts is unlikely, 
especially as most married couples own their homes as equal partners.200 
187  Id. 
188  Id. 
189  Id. at 1059. 
190  Id. 
191  Id. 
192  Id. 
193  Id. 
194  Id. 
195  Id. 
196  Id. 
197  Id. at 1059–60. 
198  Id. at 1060. 
199  Id. 
200  Id. 
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 The Ninth Circuit noted that Congress has enacted a number of tax statutes 
that halved deductions, credits, or limitations for spouses filing separately.201 
Examples include: (1) I.R.C. section 22 (a credit for the elderly and the perma-
nently or totally disabled); (2) I.R.C. section 1202 (a 50 percent exclusion for 
gain from the sale of certain small business stock); and (3) I.R.C. section 
1211(b) (a deduction limit for excess capital losses).202 Thus, demonstrating 
Congress’s awareness that treating joint filers as one taxpayer and separate fil-
ers as two taxpayers ensures that separately filing couples do not receive double 
the benefit that jointly filing couples receive.203 Finally, if Congress intended 
two or more unmarried taxpayers to be treated as a single taxpayer for the pur-
pose of a particular deduction or credit, Congress could have used the neces-
sary language.204 For example, I.R.C. section 36(b) specifically limits the 
amount of the tax credit to $8,000 for first-time homebuyers regardless of the 
number of unmarried co-owners.205 
 In Sophy, upon close examination of the definitions of qualified residence 
interest, acquisition indebtedness, and home equity indebtedness, the Tax Court 
rejected the per-taxpayer interpretation of the indebtedness limitations, finding 
the general “focus” of the statute was on the qualified residence and the “con-
spicuous absence” of “any reference to an individual taxpayer.”206 However, 
the Ninth Circuit observed that the repeated reference to the residence was only 
natural in a statute providing a deduction for interest paid on indebtedness with 
respect to a qualified residence.207 The Ninth Circuit stated that additional ref-
erences to the taxpayer could have been included, but such additional refer-
ences are unnecessary as “[a]ny reasonable reader would understand that the 
statute is speaking of a taxpayer.”208 
 Finding nothing in the statute to support the Tax Court’s per-residence in-
terpretation, the Ninth Circuit found several provisions of the statute that sup-
port a per-taxpayer interpretation.209 First, the definition of “qualified residence 
interest” refers to interest paid during the “taxable year,” and the indebtedness 
limitations refer to “for any period,” clearly referring to the “taxable year.”210 
Taxpayers, not residences, have tax years, and taxpayers may have different tax 
years.211 Nevertheless, I.R.C. section 163(h) speaks in terms of a single tax 
year, implying that the indebtedness limitations apply on a per-taxpayer ba-
201  Id. 
202  Id. 
203  Id. 
204  Id. at 1061. 
205  Id. 
206  Id. (quoting Sophy v. Comm’r, 138 T.C. 204, 210–11 (2012)). 
207  Id. at 1062. 
208  Id. 
209  Id. at 1063. 
210  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
211  Id. 
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sis.212 Moreover, under the per-residence approach, the method of applying the 
indebtedness limitations to co-owners with different tax years is unclear.213 
 The Ninth Circuit also found the Tax Court’s per-residence interpretation 
difficult to reconcile with the statute’s definition of “qualified residence.”214 
I.R.C. section 163(h)(4)(A) defines qualified residence as
the principal residence (within the meaning of section 121) of the taxpayer, and
1 other residence of the taxpayer which is selected by the taxpayer for purposes 
of this subsection for the taxable year and which is used by the taxpayer as a res-
idence (within the meaning of section 280A(d)(1)).215  
If the taxpayer owns multiple secondary residences, the taxpayer can annually 
select a different residence as the other residence.216 The definition of a quali-
fied residence clearly focuses on the taxpayer.217 In addition, the Tax Court’s 
per-residence approach would be difficult to apply to co-owners of a residence 
each having a different qualified residence.218 By contrast, a per-taxpayer ap-
proach would be easy to apply to co-owners with multiple residences.219 The 
Ninth Circuit opinion included the following example: 
[T]wo individuals might each have a separate primary residence but go in to-
gether on a vacation home in Maui. For such co-owners, filing tax returns under
the Tax Court’s per-residence approach would be like running a three-legged
race. The co-owners are tied together for one home but not the other. This would
mean that the two (or it could be three or four) co-owners would have to coordi-
nate their tax returns to ensure that the aggregate amount of acquisition debt for
each taxpayer’s “qualified residence” does not exceed $1 million. It would also
mean that one co-owner’s deduction might depend on the size of another co-
owner’s mortgage on a home in which the first co-owner has no interest.220
 Finally, the fact that the parenthetical language creates a marriage penalty 
is not of significant concern to the Ninth Circuit.221 The Ninth Circuit noted that 
“Congress may have had perfectly legitimate reasons for distinguishing be-
tween married and unmarried taxpayers.”222 Significant tax benefits may result 
to a married couple opting to file a joint return, such as lower tax rates at vari-
ous income levels.223 Further, if a married taxpayer filing a separate return is 
limited to an aggregate of $550,000 of indebtedness, implicitly, a married cou-
212  Id. 
213  Id. 
214  Id. 
215  Id. at 1063–64 (quoting I.R.C. § 163(h)(4)(A)(i) (2012)) (internal quotations omitted). 
216  Id. at 1064. 
217  Id. 
218  Id. 
219  Id. 
220  Id. 
221  Id. at 1065. 
222  Id. 
223  Id. 
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ple filing a joint return is limited to an aggregate of $1.1 million of indebted-
ness.224 The apparent purpose of the parenthetical is to ensure that married cou-
ples are treated as a single taxpayer regardless of whether they file separately or 
jointly.225 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit noted: 
If two individuals who are engaged to be married each own their own house and 
each have their own $1 million mortgage, both get to deduct all of their interest. 
But if they get married and file a joint return, they are treated as one taxpayer 
and can then only deduct half of their interest.226 
E. Voss Dissent
 The dissent in Voss laments that the interpretation by the majority of the
indebtedness limitations allows unmarried taxpayers, who buy “an expensive 
residence,” to deduct twice the amount of the interest paid on indebtedness than 
married taxpayers.227 Since the language of the statute is ambiguous, the rea-
sonable interpretation by the Service that limits unmarried taxpayers to the 
same amount of qualified residence interest deduction as married taxpayers fil-
ing jointly should be given deference.228 
 In C.C.A. 200911007, the Service’s application of the statute is straight-
forward.229 With regards to a single taxpayer, only interest payments on a max-
imum of $1.1 million of indebtedness are deductible under I.R.C. section 
163(h)(3).230 Similarly, a married couple filing jointly is subject to the $1.1 mil-
lion indebtedness limitations, which is consistent with the typical treatment of a 
married couple filing jointly as one taxpayer under the I.R.C.231 As to an un-
married co-owner, the Service interpreted the statute to limit the deduction of 
qualified residence interest to a maximum of $1.1 million of indebtedness.232 
 The dissent rejects the taxpayer’s interpretation of I.R.C. section 163(h)(3) 
as contrary to the Service’s reasonable and persuasive interpretation of the stat-
ute in C.C.A. 200911007.233 The plain meaning of the statute does not compel 
the taxpayer’s interpretation that the indebtedness limitations apply on a per-
taxpayer basis, allowing unmarried co-owners double the deductible interest of 
224  Id. at 1067. 
225  Id. at 1065. 
226  Id. 
227  Id. at 1068 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
228  Id. 
229  Id. at 1069; see supra Part IV B (discussing the Service’s position in C.C.A. 200911007 
that the acquisition indebtedness limitation applies on a per-residence basis). 
230  Voss, 796 F.3d at 1069 (Ikuta, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying notes 95 and 
105 (discussing the Service’s position in C.C.A. 200940030 and Revenue Ruling 2010-25, 
which allows for the aggregation of the indebtedness limitations upon the acquisition, con-
struction, or substantial improvement of a qualified residence). 
231  Voss, 796 F.3d at 1069 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
232  Id. at 1069–70. 
233  Id. at 1071. 
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single taxpayers or married taxpayers filing jointly.234 Rather, the statute does 
not indicate how the indebtedness limitations are to be applied to multiple co-
owners. In such a circumstance, “we can afford respect to an agency’s interpre-
tation of a statute, whether it is offered in an opinion letter, policy statement, 
agency manual, or even a well-reasoned legal brief.”235 The dissent further 
states that the measure of deference to which an agency’s interpretation is enti-
tled is proportional to the “thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validi-
ty of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and 
all those factors which give it power to persuade.”236  
 In response, the majority agrees that C.C.A. 200911007 is entitled to the 
“measure of deference proportional to the ‘thoroughness evident in its consid-
eration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pro-
nouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade.’ ”237 Ap-
plying these factors, the majority suggests that C.C.A. 200911007 should be 
given “limited weight.”238 The majority held the one-paragraph analysis inter-
preting the application of the statute to unmarried co-owners was neither thor-
ough nor exhaustive.239 C.C.A. 200911007 treats the question as governed by 
the “plain language of the statute.”240 However, the majority finds that the 
briefs of the parties, the Tax Court decision, and the statute itself demonstrate 
that the statute’s language is anything but plain.241 The approach taken in 
C.C.A. 200911007 was not a consistent position, established understanding, or
comparable consensus of the Service.242 Other than the Service’s litigation po-
234  See id. 
235  Id. (citing Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)). 
236  Id. (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001)). The dissent sup-
ported the position taken by the Service in C.C.A. 200911007 as reasonable and persuasive, 
arguing: (1) the Service’s interpretation is consistent with the text of the statute that can be 
read to establish indebtedness limitations of $1.1 million per qualified residence regardless 
of the number of co-owners; (2) the Service’s interpretation does not result in a windfall to 
unmarried taxpayers; and (3) the Service has consistently applied its interpretation of the 
I.R.C. section 163(h)(3) indebtedness limitations. Id. at 1071–72. The dissent stated: “A
more logical inference is that the deduction was aimed at promoting home ownership for or-
dinary folks, not to help wealthy individuals purchase mansions that are encumbered with
more than $1.1 million of debt.” Id. at 1072. Disagreeing with the analysis of the majority,
the dissent further argues, in summary: (1) other than referencing the definition of a “quali-
fied residence,” nothing indicates that either Congress or the Service contemplated that the
approach used in I.R.C. section 121 should determine the amount of indebtedness limitations
under I.R.C. section 163(h)(3); (2) the parenthetical language does not provide textual sup-
port for a per-taxpayer approach; and (3) there are practical difficulties in determining the
amount of qualified residence interest deduction of each unmarried co-owner under a per-
residence interpretation. Id. at 1072–75.
237  Id. at 1066 (majority opinion) (quoting Christopher v. Smith Kline Beecham Corp. 132 S. 
Ct. 2156, 2168–69 (2012)). 
238  Id. 
239  Id. 
240  Id. (quoting C.C.A. 200911007, supra note 134, at 4). 
241  Id. 
242  Id. 
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sition in this case, C.C.A. 200911007 is the only pronouncement addressing 
how the indebtedness limitations apply to unmarried co-owners of a qualified 
residence.243 “The agency’s guidance is closer to a ‘mere[] . . . litigating posi-
tion’ than to an ‘agency interpretation of ‘longstanding’ duration.’ ”244 Further, 
the majority states: 
       At bottom, although an IRS Chief Counsel Advice statement “is helpful in 
determining the position of the IRS,” it is an internal IRS memorandum prepared 
by an individual IRS attorney. The document itself cautions that it “may not be 
used or cited as precedent.” Indeed, the IRS could issue a memorandum taking 
the opposite position tomorrow, “apparently without revoking the earlier guid-
ance.”245 
V. ACTION ON DECISION 2016-02
 In Action on Decision (“A.O.D.”) 2016-02, the Service acquiesced to the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Voss.246 In Voss, the Ninth Circuit held that the ac-
quisition indebtedness limitation and the home equity indebtedness limitation 
apply to unmarried co-owners of a qualified residence on a per-taxpayer basis 
rather than a per-residence basis.247 In A.O.D. 2016-02, the Service announced 
that it will follow the Voss opinion and apply the indebtedness limitations on a 
per-taxpayer basis.248 Each unmarried co-owner of a qualified residence will be 
allowed to deduct interest paid on a maximum of $1 million of acquisition in-
debtedness and $100,000 of home equity indebtedness pursuant to I.R.C. sec-
tion 163(h)(3).249 The Service noted that the Ninth Circuit based its conclusion 
largely on its interpretation of the parenthetical language expressly providing 
that married individuals filing separate returns are entitled to deduct interest on 
a maximum of $500,000 of acquisition indebtedness and $50,000 of home eq-
uity indebtedness.250 “By providing lower debt limits for married couples, and 
not for unmarried co-owners, Congress singled out married couples for specific 
treatment, implying that an unmarried co-owner filing a separate return is enti-
tled to deduct interest on up to $1,000,000 of acquisition indebtedness and 
$100,000 of home equity indebtedness.”251 
243  Id. 
244  Id. at 1066–67 (quoting Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. E.P.A., 540 U.S. 461, 
487–88 (2004)). 
245  Id. at 1067–68 (internal citations omitted). 
246  Voss v. Comm’r, 796 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2015), action on dec., 2016-02 (Aug. 1, 2016). 
247  Voss, 796 F.3d at 1068; see supra Part IV D (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Voss, which held that the I.R.C. section 163(h)(3) indebtedness limitations apply to unmar-
ried co-owners on a per-taxpayer basis). 
248  Voss, 796 F.3d 1051, action on dec., 2016-02, at 2. 
249  Id. at 1–2.  
250  Id. at 1.  
251  Id. at 1–2. 
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 Prior to 1991, the Service only published acquiescence or nonacquiescence 
in certain Tax Court decisions.252 Since that time, the Service has expanded its 
acquiescence program to include other civil tax cases, including cases before 
District Courts, Claims Courts, and Circuit Courts.253 The purpose of an A.O.D 
is to provide guidance to Service personnel working with the same or similar 
issues.254 An A.O.D. will be relied on within the Service merely as the applica-
tion of the tax law to the facts of a particular case at the time the A.O.D. was 
issued.255 “[A]cquiescence” means that the Service accepts the holding of the 
court and “will follow it in disposing of cases with the same controlling 
facts.”256 Unlike Treasury Regulations and Revenue Rulings, an A.O.D. is not 
an affirmative statement of the Service’s position, “[i]t is not intended to serve 
as public guidance and may not be cited as precedent.”257 An A.O.D. may be 
superseded by new legislation, regulations, rulings, cases, or future A.O.D.’s.258 
 With the Service’s acquiescence to the Voss decision, only Congress can 
provide the necessary clarity and certainty in the application of this commonly 
used tax provision. Congress must decide whether the application of the indebt-
edness limitations on a per-taxpayer basis is proper from a tax, fiscal, and so-
cial policy perspective and legislate accordingly: 
Had Congress wanted to make clear that the debt limits apply per taxpayer, it 
could have drafted the provisions to limit “the aggregate amount each taxpayer 
may treat as” acquisition or home equity debt. But it did not. Or, had Congress 
wanted to make clear that the debt limits apply per residence, it could have pro-
vided that the debt limits must be divided or allocated in the event that two or 
more unmarried individuals co-own a qualified residence.259 
VI. SHOULD THE DEDUCTION FOR QUALIFIED RESIDENCE INTEREST BE
REPEALED OR AMENDED? 
 Should the deduction for qualified residence interest continue in its current 
form, be repealed or substantially limited, or replaced with an income tax cred-
it? Congress should address this question because the qualified residence inter-
est deduction is very costly. The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that, 
for fiscal years 2015 through 2019, the deduction of qualified residence interest 
on owner-occupied residences will cost the federal government $419.8 billion 
in forgone tax revenue.260 This tax expenditure costs an estimated $85 billion 
252  Actions Relating to Decisions of the Tax Court, 2016-31 I.R.B. 193 (Aug. 1, 2016). 
253  Id. 
254  Id. 
255  Id. 
256  Id. 
257  Id. 
258  Id. 
259  Voss v. Comm’r, 796 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2015) (emphasis in original). 
260  JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES
FOR FISCAL YEARS 2015–2019, at 32 tbl.1 (Comm. Print 2015). 
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more than the combined tax cost of the deduction for real property taxes261 and 
the exclusion of capital gains on the sale of a principal residence.262 The De-
partment of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, estimates that, for fiscal 
years 2015 through 2025, the deduction of qualified residence interest will re-
sult in $948.5 billion in foregone tax revenue263 and is ranked fourth in tax ex-
penditures only behind: (1) exclusion from income of employer contributions to 
medical insurance premiums and medical care; (2) exclusion of net imputed 
rental income of owner-occupants of a residence; and (3) the lower tax rate for 
capital gains, excepting agriculture, timber, iron ore, and coal.264 The Service’s 
acquiescence to the application of the indebtedness limitations on a per-
taxpayer basis will only increase the cost of this tax preference in foregone rev-
enue. 
 In addition to viewing tax incentives as direct government spending admin-
istered through the tax code, the particular policy objective the tax incentive is 
intended to achieve should also be analyzed.265 The deductibility of qualified 
residence interest has been defended on the ground that the deduction promotes 
tax fairness between taxpayers who own residences without a mortgage and 
taxpayers who own residences with a mortgage.266 Then again, homeowners 
already receive a tax advantage by not being taxed on imputed rental income as 
the owner occupant of the residence, and homeowners with a mortgage would 
have less imputed rental income than the homeowner without a mortgage be-
cause of the deductible interest expense.267 Of course, taxpayers who do not 
own but rent their residence receive neither the tax benefit of the exclusion of 
imputed rent nor the deduction for qualified residence interest.268 Further, this 
tax incentive is limited to taxpayers with home mortgages and no tax considera-
tion is given to purchasers of other consumer durables, such as automobiles.269 
The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, in its explanation of the amend-
ments to I.R.C. section 163 by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, stated: “While 
Congress recognized that the imputed rental value of owner-occupied housing 
may be a significant source of untaxed income, the Congress nevertheless de-
261  See I.R.C. § 164(a)(1) (2012). 
262  See id. § 121; JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 260, at 32 tbl.1 (subtracting the 
total deduction for property taxes on real property ($184.5 billion) and the total Exclusion of 
capital gains on sales of principal residences ($149.9 billion) from the total deduction for 
mortgage interest on owner-occupied residences ($419.8 billion)). 
263  U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, TAX EXPENDITURES 22 tbl.1, 30 
tbl.2b (2015). 
264  Id. at 33 tbl.3. 
265  See generally Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Govern-
ment Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 
(1970). 
266  BITTKER ET AL., supra note 44, ¶ 22.02, at 22-3. 
267  Id. ¶ 22.02, at 22-4. 
268  Id. 
269  Id.; see MCDANIEL ET AL., supra note 16, at 748 (discussing the policy of allowing a de-
duction for home mortgage interest and real property tax on personal residences). 
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termined that encouraging home ownership is an important policy goal, 
achieved in part by providing a deduction for residential mortgage interest.”270 
 The most common criticism of the qualified residence interest deduction is 
that the deduction benefits the highest-income taxpayers.271 Several factors con-
tribute to this deduction being more valuable to high-income taxpayers than 
low-income taxpayers.272 First, as a result of the progressive rate structure of 
the federal income tax, the value of an itemized deduction depends on the tax-
payer’s marginal rate.273 For example, a taxpayer with a top marginal rate of 
39.6 percent would save $39.60 from an additional $100 of qualified residence 
interest deduction whereas a taxpayer with a top marginal rate of 25 percent 
would save only $25. 
 Second, to claim a deduction for qualified residence interest, taxpayers 
must itemize their deductions rather than claim a standard deduction in filing 
their federal tax returns.274 Although real estate, home building, and mortgage 
lending organizations attempt to portray the qualified residence interest deduc-
tion as vital to the middle class,275 the analysis of the data by the Joint Commit-
tee on Taxation tells a different story. For the 2014 tax year, the Joint Commit-
tee on Taxation determined that only approximately 39 percent of taxpayers 
itemized their deductions.276 Further, low-income taxpayers tend not to own 
residences, or, if a residence is owned, the purchase price and correspondingly 
the mortgage is generally less than high-income taxpayers.277 The President’s 
Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform has criticized the qualified residence 
interest deduction for primarily encouraging construction of larger homes and 
not necessarily broadening home ownership among the middle-income taxpay-
ers.278 
 Recently, numerous proposals to modify the qualified residence interest 
deduction have emerged, including the following alternatives and considera-
tions: (1) retain the current deduction; (2) repeal the current deduction; (3) limit 
the current deduction; or (4) replace the current deduction with a credit. 
270  JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 27, at 263–64. 
271  See, e.g., WILL FISCHER & CHYE-CHING HUANG, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES,
MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION IS RIPE FOR REFORM 1 (2013). 
272  See id. at 3; Gerald Prante, Who Benefits from the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction?, 
TAX FOUND. (Feb. 6, 2006), http://taxfoundation.org/article/who-benefits-home-mortgage-
interest-deduction [https://perma.cc/4UBA-Z9FR]. 
273  FISCHER & HUANG, supra note 271, at 4; Prante, supra note 272. 
274  FISCHER & HUANG, supra note 271, at 2; Prante, supra note 272. 
275  See Prante, supra note 272. 
276  JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 260, at 43 tbl.2 (dividing the total Itemized Re-
turn (45,953) by the Total Returns (168,943)). 
277  FISCHER & HUANG, supra note 271; Prante, supra note 272. 
278  PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PRO-GROWTH:
PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA’S TAX SYSTEM 73–74 (2005). 
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A. Retain the Current Deduction
 I.R.C. section 163(h)(3) could remain in its current form. The qualified res-
idence interest deduction is popular among homeowners and industry groups, 
such as the National Association of Realtors, the National Association of 
Homebuilders, and the Mortgage Bankers Association.279 Although it is gener-
ally believed to promote the buying of homes,280 economic research suggests 
that the deduction may not achieve the policy objective of an increase in home-
ownership.281 
B. Repeal the Current Deduction
 Congress could repeal the qualified residence interest deduction, which is
an exception to the general disallowance of deductions for personal interest. 
The repeal of I.R.C. section 163(h)(3) would help promote the more uniform 
treatment of taxpayers. Taxpayers owning or renting their home or living in dif-
ferent parts of the country282 would have greater tax equality.283 It would also 
increase federal revenue, improving the long-term budgetary situation of the 
United States.284 
 With regard to the potential effect on homeownership, economists have 
identified the primary barrier to homeownership to be the high transactional 
costs of purchasing a home, especially the requirement of a down payment.285 
Since the qualified residence interest deduction does not address this primary 
barrier and does not target the group of potential homebuyers most in need of 
assistance, namely, lower-income households, the effect on homeownership of 
eliminating the deduction is likely to be minimal over the long term.286 Howev-
er, the repeal of the qualified residence interest deduction may have negative 
consequences to the economy in the short term.287 For example, the sudden 
elimination of the deduction could cause a drop in home demand with a corre-
sponding drop in home prices.288 The decrease in home prices could lead to a 
279  KEIGHTLEY, supra note 8, at 10. 
280  Id. 
281  Id.; see Christian A. L. Hilber & Tracy M. Turner, The Mortgage Interest Deduction and 
Its Impact on Homeownership Decisions, 96 REV. ECON. & STAT. 618, 618–19 (2014) (ex-
amining the impact of the combined state and federal mortgage interest deduction on home-
ownership attainment). 
282  See KEIGHTLEY, supra note 8, at 10 (analyzing the variation in the mortgage interest de-
duction tax expenditure across the states); see also Patricia A. Cain, Unmarried Couples and 
the Mortgage Interest Deduction, 123 TAX NOTES 473, 473–74 (2009) (discussing the in-
debtedness limitations in relation to home prices in certain areas of the United States, espe-
cially California). 
283  See KEIGHTLEY, supra note 8, at 10. 
284  Id. 
285  Id. at 11. 
286  Id. 
287  Id. 
288  Id. 
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reduction in new home construction, a reduction in homeowner wealth, and, 
possibly, an increase in mortgage defaults.289 Gradually phasing out the quali-
fied residence interest deduction over a period of time may mitigate the nega-
tive consequences to the economy and the housing market.290 
C. Limit the Current Deduction
 Currently, taxpayers may deduct interest on $1 million of acquisition in-
debtedness and $100,000 of home equity indebtedness, secured by their princi-
pal residence or a second designated residence.291 The tax equity of the quali-
fied residence interest deduction would be greatly increased, and the tax cost of 
the interest deduction would be greatly decreased, if the indebtedness limita-
tions were reduced and/or the type of indebtedness was limited only to acquisi-
tion indebtedness.292 Another option would be to retain the current indebtedness 
limitations but limit the amount of the interest deduction to a percentage of the 
taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.293 With regard to the long-standing tradition 
of allowing an interest deduction for indebtedness secured by a second home, 
the nonpartisan Tax Policy Center offered a rough estimate that repealing the 
deduction for second homes could generate $8 billion in tax revenues annual-
ly.294 With the Service’s acquiescence to the Voss decision, the tax equity of the 
qualified residence interest deduction would be greatly increased, and the tax 
cost of the interest deduction would be greatly decreased, if Congress legislated 
that the indebtedness limitations apply on a per-residence basis.295 
D. Replace the Current Deduction with a Credit
 Several proposals have been advanced to replace the qualified residence in-
terest deduction with a tax credit.296 The current deduction provides a propor-
tionally larger tax benefit to upper-income taxpayers since they tend to buy 
more expensive homes and are subject to higher marginal tax rates.297 Also, the 
289  Id. 
290  Id. 
291 I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (2012).
292 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 3191, BUDGET OPTIONS VOL. 2, at 187 (2009).
293 KEIGHTLEY, supra note 8, at 12.
294 Richard Rubin, Second-Home Deduction Future Depends on Congress Using It,
BLOOMBERG (July 23, 2013, 8:26 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-07-
23/second-home-deduction-future-depends-on-congress-using-it [https://perma.cc/N437-NV 
N4]. 
295  See supra Part V (discussing the Service’s acquiescence to the Voss decision and the pos-
sible need for legislation). 
296  See AMANDA ENG ET AL., TAX POLICY CTR., URBAN INST. & BROOKINGS INST., OPTIONS 
TO REFORM THE DEDUCTION FOR HOME MORTGAGE INTEREST 2 (2013) (considering a pro-
posal to repeal the current deduction and define eligible mortgage interest as interest in-
curred on up to $500,000 of an eligible mortgage and allowing a nonrefundable credit of 15 
percent or, in the alternative, 20 percent of eligible mortgage interest). 
297  KEIGHTLEY, supra note 8, at 13. 
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fact that taxpayers must itemize their deductions before taking advantage of the 
qualified residence interest deduction also limits the number of taxpayers who 
can take advantage of this tax preference.298 A credit, unlike a deduction, has 
the same dollar-for-dollar value to taxpayers regardless of their income level.299 
Making the credit refundable would make this tax preference better targeted to 
lower-income homeowners.300 Substituting a tax credit for the qualified resi-
dence interest deduction would provide a dollar-for-dollar tax benefit for all 
taxpayers and be of greater benefit to lower-income homeowners.  
 Five of the most prominent tax credit options are summarized as follows: 
       Over the years, several mortgage interest tax credit options have been pro-
posed. . . . All five would limit the deduction to a taxpayer’s principal residence. 
Four out of the five would allow a 15% credit rate. Three of the five credit op-
tions would be nonrefundable. Two of the options would limit the size of the 
mortgage eligible for the credit to $500,000, while one would limit eligible 
mortgages to no greater than $300,000 (with an inflation adjustment). Another 
would limit the maximum eligible mortgage to 125% of the area median home 
prices. And still another would place no cap on the maximum eligible mortgage, 
but would limit the maximum tax credit one could claim to $25,000.301 
CONCLUSION 
 The questions of social and economic policy raised by I.R.C. section 
163(h)(3) will continue to generate discussion and scholarship. The issues ad-
dressed in Sophy and Voss, the application of the qualified residence interest 
deduction and the level of judicial deference given the varied pronouncements 
by the Service, will undoubtedly be subject to litigation and legislation in the 
future. Complicating the evaluation of the statute are concerns regarding the 
fairness of a tax incentive given to homeownership, the even greater tax benefit 
to wealthy taxpayers, the dramatic geographic disparity in the cost of home-
ownership, the proliferation of the marriage penalty, and the disparate treatment 
of married and unmarried cohabitants. The acquiescence of the Service to the 
Voss decision, applying the indebtedness limitations on a per-taxpayer basis, 
has assured a greater tax preference to higher-income taxpayers and unmarried, 
co-owners of residences. This seemingly simple statute has required a very de-
liberate analysis of its language, congressional intent, and policy implications, 
and a methodical application of almost the entire inventory of the rules of statu-
tory interpretation. 
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